Contract Law

Privity

•    If C is a stranger to a contract between A & B, then C must fail legal action

•    In a contract between A & B in which C is a beneficiary, the A-B contract contemplates C.  C is still a third party, but not a stranger – is actually named in the agreement.
o    Beneficiary – the recipient of a benefit under the contract.
o    Our system of law treats the third-party beneficiary the same as the third-party stranger.
o    1861 case established this.
o    in earlier cases, C coud sue on the contract
o    once contract theory evolved, C became a victim of the quest for theoretical purity.

•    If A & B form a contract with A working as an agent for C, then C is not a mere third-party beneficiary.  C is a party.  A is not.
•    If A & B have a contract which has not yet been performed (any contract creates private rights – rights are property; choses in action), A has rights against B, and can, if A chooses, “alienate” their rights against B to another party.  Can sell or give incorporeal rights (assign).
o    C gains the rights to what A assigns C.
o    A-C contract.  A had rights under the A-B contract, but sold them to C = assignment.
o    Question:  What rights does C have under the A-B contract?  Suppose B breaks the promise – Can C sue?
•    Equity will allow C to sue B.
•    A is still in the original contract, but so is C.  C could sue B, but might have to sue B using A’s name.
•    Superficially, case would be A v. B,  but would actually be C sueing B.  This is how equity works in this situation.
•    Now there is a statute in every province which simplifies this situation.

Third A-B-C relationship:
•    The trust example
•    A & B have a contract (if unperformed, then each have subsisting rights against the other.  Rights are property.  Choses in action.)
o    A may hold the property (the right against B), not for his or her own benefit, but for the benefit of C.
•    A – trustee (of contractual rights)
•    C – beneficiary of the trust.
•    Referred to as cestqui que trust
o    If A does not act as a vigilant trustee, sueing B for unperformed actions, then C can unequivocally sue B.
o    Here, dealing with property – in the eyes of equity, A’s rights do not belong to A at all.  Belong to C.  Not suing on basis of contract.  Sueing for property.  A has legal title, C has equitable title.

New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd.
•    There was a view that courts do not have the authority to change the privity rule, and says that the onus is on the legislature to change it.
•    The tide turned a little in New Zealand Shipping (page 381 onwards)
•    House of Lords, though unwilling to change the rule, softened up on recognizing trust and agency to get around the rule.
o    Did not change the rule – signalled a softening.

London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd.
Page 385
•    Goes much futher than New Zealand Shipping
•    Does in private law something that is rarely seen – grapples with the doctrine itself.
•    Interesting discussion on the issue addressed by Simonds (not the place of the court to change even judge-created laws).
•    SCC addresses the question.  Iocobucci J. says that judges can make incremental changes, but not large changes in well-accepted private-law rules.
•    Agrees that major changes to this would have to come from legislatures – in Canada, this means each provincial legislature, due to the Constitution.
•    Contract between A & B, which agrees that in certain circumstances, B will not sue C.  Shield promise.  Exemption promise.
o    Contrast to contract such as insurance policy where the goal is to confer a benefit on C.
•    Limitation of liability clause.  C’s defence would be based on the contract between A & B.
o    Court reasons that letting C defend itself is less radical than conferring a benefit on C.
•    London Drugs is a bailment case.
o    The bailee is a corporation – a warehouse.
o    Corporations can operate only through human agency – human beings.
o    The employees are negligent in handling the bailor’s chattel.
o    They are tortfeasors
o    The bailor sues the bailee – the human employees of the bailee.
o    Page 385 – the liability clause.
•    The bailor did not pay the additional charge to cover warehouse liability
•    Means, in effect, that the bailor took the risk on themselves.
•    In the suit against the employer (the warehouse) the warehouse was covered against liability by this clause, and was liable for only $40.
o    What of the employees?  Question of whether they were shielded.
o    Note:
•    1)  The reciprocity objection:  would allow a person to sue on a contract when that person could not be sued on the contract.
•    Lack of reciprocity
•    This is a trad. objection allowing C to sue as a third party.
•    2)  A & B contract.  One of the rights is to change their contract (though this is sometimes tricky -  need consideration).  As soon as one says that C acquires a right under A-B contract, that seems to inhibit A & B’s right to alter contracts.
•    The law does not allow us to destroy other people’s rights.
o    Iacobucci J. addresses these issues.
•    Says that rather than trying to find a way around the privity problem, will instead change the doctrine of privity.
•    Do not think that he tries to find that the warehouse contracted on the right of its employees.
•    Does not find any rel. in privity between the bailor and the bailee’s employees
•    Allows the employees to have rights even though they are not in privity
•    Says that in an employment situation, when A deals with B, knowing that B has employees, and that the actions can only be carried out by the employees, to give B’s employees certain rights under the A-B contract is not so very radical (should not take the bailor by surprise).
•    Much turns on C being an employee of B.
•    Paragraph 46, page 395.
o    “I am of the view that employees may obtain such a benefit if the following requirements are satisfied…
•    limitation of liability clause must, expressly or impliedly extend its benefit to employees
•    the employees seeking the benefit of the clause must have been acting in the course of their employment and been performing the very services provided for in the contract between their employer and the plaintiff (customer) when the loss occurred.
o    Said that the bailor was promising the bailee that if the bailee’s employees committed a tort, they would be shielded from liability above $40
•    ends up (on page 397) saying that by implication, the promise to the bailee covered not just the bailee, but also the employees (note – not saying that the bailor promised the employees – promised the bailee).
•    Cannot find the promise expressed – finds it implied.
•    Top of 397 – employees were not to benefit?  Says the language of the clause means inevitably that the employees were not covered.
•    The test of intention here, then, is a very shallow test.
•    Believes, on the facts, that when the bailor and bailee did contemplate (though not expressed) that the employees would be shielded from liability.
•    In the context of employment, employees can raise defences to lawsuits – the SCC has made an enormous practical and symbolic inroad into the doctrin of privity.
•    NOT saying that the employees were parties to the contract – saying they were intended beneficiaries.
•    As such, can invoke this defensively as a shield.  Still would not allow this to be used offensively.
•    The reason courts do not take the trust or agency argument and make them cure-alls is just because they would be cure-alls

Read up to Law Reform Act for next day.
Monday’s class will be review.
Can have another review class on Tuesday – 12:30pm tentatively

[It’s been awhile…]

page 311 – review Foakes v. Beer
…long line of sorrows springing from this case…
•    Pinnel’s Case:  A debtor’s promise to pay a creditor a lessor sum is not consideration
•    Foakes v. Beer not altogether satisfactory – note that judges both express sheepishess at their ruling.
•    Note 1 page 311 – Mercantile Law Amendment Act R.S.O. 1990 – intended to overrule Foakes v. Beer.
o    Passed in ON the year after Foakes v. Beer.  Also passed in B.C., AB, SK, and MN (Western Provinces).
o    Rare for a legislature to take steps to reverse a ruling
o    The Atl. Provinces still use Foakes v. Beer.
o    Must understand the hazard of the rule of this case.
•    Think of how Roffey Bros. would apply to Foakes v. Beer.
o    Courts said did not apply.  This is because of precedent.  Foakes was a HoL decision, whereas

Estoppel
High Trees p 315
•    Denning takes time to say that if the other view of estoppel prevails, would undo Foakes v. Beer (indirectly, but estoppel route)
o    Would estop the creditor from acting against the debtor in such a case.
•    Says it again in Combe v. Combe p 318
o    Again, not a Foakes v. Beer case.

D. & C. Builders Ltd. v. Rees
•    Denning ought to end this case with a vidincation of the stance of estoppel.
•    Does not.  The debtor loses.  The creditor triumphs.  Why?
•    Explained against rule of Foakes v. Beer.
•    Must examine against backdrop of estoppel
o    Remember that this is promissory estoppel.
•    Recall that when Denning ‘invented’ this in high trees, the reach of the doctrine was unknown (p 316)
o    Combe v. Combe – Denning pulled back from the potential effect of his own words.
•    Affirmed the principle of promissory estoppel, but added *‘provinded that the promissee is not invoking estoppel offensively [is not suing on the basis of estoppel!]’*
•    Sword / shield distinction.
•    Now on to D. & C. Builders.
•    From structure of the case (fact that it is three judges, all of whom issue agreeing judgements), see that the judges agree on the result, but not how to get there.
o    Same as in Brophy Bros.?
•    Facts of D. & C. Builders – builders do a job for the defendants who claimed shoddy workmanship, and could not pay the £482 balance.  Offerered £300, which the builders had to take as they were in financial trouble.
o    Is the ‘agreement’ to take the £300 binding?
•    Is this a case of ‘promise intended to be relied on, and then relied on’?
•    Denning, in High Trees and Combe v. Combe, has led us to believe that it will – but it does not.
•    Note paragragh 2 page 323:  facts.  “At this stage there was no dispute as to the work done.”
o    What is the significance of this?
o    From Stilk, if prior to entering into the negotiation, there had been a legal dispute between the two sides in regards to how much the Reeses properly owed (with potentially shoddy work in mind), then could  have compromised / settled on £300, and it would have been binding.
•    Each side would have bargained to give up legal claim agianst the other.
•    However, when the fee was reduced, there was no legal dispute
•    For some reason, the complaint that Mrs. Rees makes at top of page 324 does not count – does not seem to have been in correct form?  i.e.  We do not owe you this money because the workmanship was not up to par.
•    Why does estoppel not come to the rescue of Mr. & Mrs. Rees?
o    The court does not allow them to estop the creditors from asserting their strict legal rights to the full balance owing.
o    Why can they not use estoppel as their shield?
•    Mrs. Rees had overstepped – p 325 para 10 – “She had no right to say any such thing.”  She had no right to threaten them with non-payment, knowing that they were on the brink of bankruptsey…
•    This is odd.  Obviously do not normally have to be altruistic in negotiations.
•    Bell:  Don’t get distracted by this point, because it is so strange.
o    Think rather of the larger point – Denning reminds us of High Trees – estoppel doctrine is an equitable doctrine.  EVERYTHING EQUITABLE IS DISCRETIONARY.  This means that the court can exercise its discretion in withholding what it might otherwise grant.
o    Traditionally say law is the realm of rights, and equity is a realm of discretion (not rights).
o    Note para 9 page 325 – “Equity has stretched out a merciful hand to help the debtor…”
o    Para 10 – ‘not going to do it here though.’
o    Note:  Promissee cannot sue on promissory estoppel; Promissory estoppel is equitable and therefore discretionary.
•    To accept Denning’s hint in High Trees and Combe, that promissory estoppel would get one out of rule from Foakes v. Beer, then Dankwerts L.J. and Winn L.J’s reasons for decision might be startling.
o    Do not acknowledge awareness of the idea of promissory estoppel as applied in high trees and Combe.
o    No hint that promissory estoppel might have applied.
•    Lord Denning’s decision from this case is the most famous and referred to.
o    Does not, however, carry a majority
o    What does the case stand for??
o    Question of whether estoppel will get one out from under rule of Foakes v. Beer remains unanswered and ambiguous.
o    Consult readings on reserve…

Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher
[Bell:  “The last challenging case of the term]
High Court in Aus.  Seems to be their Supreme Court.
5 judges – 4 wrote…
•    This case seems to abolish the sword / shield distinction
•    Seems to say that there are cases where the promissee can sue on the basis of promissory estoppel.
•    Further difficulty:  in this case, the counsel for Mahar … in this case there isn’t even a promise … the challenge for the counsel for Mahar is to first show that there was an express promise where there was none.
•    Implicit promise gathered from the facts.  Showed that there was in effect a promise.
•    Facts:  Waltons wanted to develop a site for shopping centre.  Bell guesses that Waltons is likely an Aus. Walmart.  Mahars are landowners – there is a site with a building on it, which Waltons wants to occupy as tenant.  Mahars is required to destroy the existing building, and to build a new one to Waltons’ criteria.
o    Get close to a deal.  Waltons’ solicitor sends a draft lease to the Mahar’s solicitor which is pretty close to final form
o    P 333 – notes that have not obtained Waltons’ specific instruction, but would advise the very next day if there was any disagreement.
o    There was no contact the next day, nor for ‘some months’
o    Maher’s, knowing that Waltons’ could only use a new building, tore down the old building in the interim, and began building Waltons’ custom-designed building.
o    40% complete by the time Waltons’ solicitors sent a letter saying that the plan was not going ahead.
•    Before getting to estoppel, must get to a promise.
•    Here there had not been a promise, as such.
•    Somehow, all of the courts accepted that Waltons’ conduct amounted in effect to a promise [do not get hung up on this – Bell]
•    At trial and at first level of appeal, the Mahars won, not on basis of promissory estoppel, but on legal estoppel
o    Legal estoppel turns on representation of existing fact…
o    Whereas in high trees, it was not about existing fact, but on the basis of a promise.
o    Here, this is a case of enforcing a promise
•    Combe v. Combe – sword / shield distinction.
•    Para 16 & 17 page334
o    Para 20 – begin argument by saying that looking back at high trees, ignoring combe, high trees is broad enough to cover this situation.
o    However, thanks to Combe, promissory estoppel is a defensive equity, not an offensive equity.
•    However, being defensive does not mean that it may only be used by defendants…
•    Unless court intervenes, would be to the promisee’s detriment.
o    Trad. objections to using estoppel as a sword is that it would supercede the Doctrine of Consideration.
o    Next trad. objection is that enforcing consideration as promise is to enforce gratutious promises
•    The law does not enforce gift promises.
•    Now to say that all promises without consideration are gift-promises (though within high-theory is high true) is slightly misleading, but this is an objection.
•    Question is that if we did start enforcing gifts, where would it end?
•    Para 23 & 24:
o    23:  talk about Crabbe v. Arun District Council
•    Crabb owned land.
•    Has access to the street (let’s say, at the South)
•    Another access at the North.
•    Crabb gets offer to divide the land
•    Local municipality tells him that though the south access is the normal access to the land, he can use the north access legally.
•    Sells parcel B – the south part of the land.
•    Doesn’t bother reserving a right-of-way, because he has been promised the north access by the municipality.
•    After this deal goes through, the municipality tells him that the North access cannot be used.
•    He sues them, resulting in this case.
•    Crabb has a promise that he wants to enforrce:
•    No seal
•    No consideration
•    Must rely on estoppel – a promise intended to be relied on, and relied on.
o    Problem of course is that he would be using estoppel as a sword not a shield.
o    This case came before Denning…
o    Denning said, “There are estoppels, and then there are estoppels…”  Some can only be used defensively, some others can be used offensively.
o    Allows Crabb to estop the Arun District Council from going back on their promise.
•    This is referred to as proprietary estoppel
o    So-called to distinguish from ordinary promissory estoppel, and because it involves ownership of land.
o    Not subject to sword / shield principle such as promissory estoppel.  Exception to Combe v. Combe rule.
•    This is the first thing that the Aus. court points out – that the sword / shield principle is not one that the law enforeces rigoursly.
•    Para 24 – look at the U.S. and how they handle estoppel
o    S90 of Restatement on Contracts
•    Restatements are not statutes.
•    They are literally restatements by legal thinkers of what they believed the law should be (American Law Institute).
•    “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such ation or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.  The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.”
•    U.S. verstion of estoppel – pitched more aggressively.

Next day – will look up to Formality – At least as far as The Seals.

Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act (NB) http://www.gnb.ca/0062/acts/acts/c%2D18%2D1.htm ss 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 23-26

•    2(3) – seems to be saying that one cannot sign away the rights assigned to you in the act.
•    24 - Where there is a contract for the sale or supply of a consumer product, the parties cannot agree to exclude or restrict any warranty or remedy provided by this Act except as provided in sections 25 and 26.
o    this section qualifies s. 2(3) – qualify only in accordancw w/25 & 26
•    25(1) – Subject to subsection (4), where there is a contract for the sale or supply of a consumer product, the parties may agree to exclude or restrict any remedy provided by this Act for breach of an express warranty, but such agreement shall be ineffective to the extent that it is shown that it would not be fair or reasonable to allow reliance on such agreement.
•    25(3) - In determining whether it would be fair or reasonable to allow reliance on an agreement to exclude or restrict any remedy provided by this Act for breach of an express warranty, regard shall be had to all the circumstances of the case.
•    so exclusion is possible as long as it is ‘fair and reasonable’
o    this is where Wilson J. got her language in Hunter v. Syncrude
o    This is the legislature’s response.  Judges do have the auth. to modify contracts in which consumers have signed away their rights.
o    In doing so, must strive for ‘fairness and reasonability’
•    This is more supple than Denning’s ver. of Fundamental Breach, which was an automatic exclusion of the limitation of liability clause.
•    Very little litigation on this act, considering its ubiquity
o    2 poss reasons:
•    The act is so effective that business parties settle rather than go through litigation while knowing that they have treated the consumer unfairly or unreasonably.
•    Consumers are foolish and lazy, especially those who have been foolish enough to sign away their rights in the first place.
•    Professor Door (?) is the drafter of this act.  Just retired from UNB.

Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd.
•    There is only one context in all of contractdom in which the sub-classification of contract terms is relevant.
o    warranty; condition
o    However, in context of remedies available to victim it is important. If victim of breach of “condition” then you have lrger selection of remedies/options than of warranty.If you are the victim of a beach of a condition, then more options are available.
•    can treat the contract as at an end; can sue for damages
o    Whereas, the victim of a breach of warranty has no other option but to make a claim for damanges – cannot cease to perform the contract.
•    For most contexts – it does not matter.
•    This case concerns a charter (of a ship).
•    When the vessel was leased, the price of shipping was high, but then went down.
•    Reason for high price of charters at this time:  Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal; formed crisis between England/France, and Egypt.  Invaded Egypt, which sank vessels in the Suez Canal.  Voyages between The Atlantic and Asia therefore took much longer.
•    To get out of the contract, tried to claim that the vessel was unsatisfactory and unseaworthy.
o    Diplock ¶2 page 576 – famous sentence for comment on final exams – look up synallagmatic
•    “human prescience being limited, it seldom does so exhaustively and often fails to do so at all.”
•    ¶3 – does the occurrence of the event deprive the party who has further undertakings still to perform of
o    If it was that kind of a breach, as to deprive the victimized party of the whole benefit, then it is a breach of a condition.
o    If it doesn’t deprive of the whole benefit, then it is the breach of a warranty
•    ¶9 – in real life, cannot classify all contract terms into just conditions and warranties.
o    supposed to classify at the point of formation
o    cannot with certainty classify all the terms as such.
•    Ex:  If buying a blue car and got a red car – difficult to say that you were deprived of the full benefit of the contract.
•    Diplock says in ¶10 – “No doubt there are many simple contratual undertakings, sometimes express but more often because of the very…”
o    There are obviously some contractual terms which are conditions
o    And there are some that are conditions
•    ¶11 – come that are of a more complex character
o    Saying that there is a 3rd class of contract term.
o    suggests that it is numerous.
o    cannot say whether or not  breach of it would deprive the victimized party essentially of the full benefit of the contract.
o    Must be classified not a priori, but from the actual consequences of the actual breach.
o    Will turn out to be condition-like, or warranty-like.
•    So we have, at the formation of a contract, conditions and warranties
•    Or they are innominant terms (or complex terms) which are divided into condition-like, or warranty-like – these are classified from the perspective of the breach.

•    In regards to this contract, says that the term that was breached was seaworthiness.
o    can be more or less substantial – depending on the situation (a hole in the hull or engine trouble)
o    Cannot tell at the formation who substantial the breach will be.

Sail Labrador Ltd. V. “Challenge One” (The)
•    SCC had to ask itself whether the contract had within it a term tatamount to a “time is of the essence” provision.
•    This is a common provision.
•    Nothing expressly in the contract to this effect.
•    SCC said ‘no’.  Did not think there was anything to that effect in the contract.
•    Though the breaching party had breached the contract, hadn’t breached a condition…

Page 654 – Misrepresentations and Warranties
•    There are 2 problem areas in Contracts where trouble tends to lie:  Exemption clauses; Pre-contractual words
•    Pre-contractual words:  For instance, the sales person may say something to induce the customer to enter into the contract.  This ‘something’ may turn out to be false.
o    Cutomer wishes to say that while there is nothing wrong with the contract per se, something happened prior to it that is relevant.
o    Evidence rule – where you have an apparently complete contract, extrinsic evidence is not admissible for modifying or contradicting the contract.
o    And yet we have seen situations where evidence does do this, but is being intro’d for another purpose.
•    The words that the ‘sales person’ utters outside the contract, but which critically induce the contract (page 654) might have 1 of 3 classifications:
o    1)  Puffery:  Words which have no legal significance.  They are mere puffery.  Ex:  “This is the best used car in Fredericton.”
o    2)  Misrepresentation:  looks like a statement of fact.  In Gallant v. All State, the assertion that the buckwheat would kill off the weeds were a statement.  If they induced the customer to enter into the ccontract, and if the words were false, then they are called a tortious misrepresentation.   Falls under tort.
o    3)  Warranties (promises):  If the words are not words of statement, but are of promise, those words (if they have legal consequence) can have consequence only in contract (the realm of promises).

Heilbut
•    Customer calls stock broker regarding the launching of a new rubber company.
•    Stock broker:  “We are.”  – entire case turns on these words.
•    Customer agrees to buy 6,000 shares
•    Company turns out not to be shares in what could legitimately be called a rubber company.
•    Does not sue the  company – it is insolvent.
•    Customer sues the stockbroker.
•    Not complaining about anything inside the contract.  He did get the shares.  He didn’t want the shares.
•     “We are” – could be a statement of fact, giving rise to liability, if at all, in tort.
•    Misprepresentation.
o    Could be a promise (warranty), giving rise to liability, if at all, under contract.
•    Problem in giving these words sig. in contract – a naked promise is valueless…
•    page 662 – At trial, the jury found that the company could not properly be called a rubber company.
o    Pre-contractual utterance was false.
o    D’s did not make a fradulant representation.
o    Did find that the SB did promise that it was a rubber compnay.
•    HoL is stuck with the findings of the jury – in particular that there was no fraud. misrepresentation here.
•    Seems that at trial, P argued that “We are” was a misrepresentation – argues under tort law.
o    If one can succeed that “we are” is fradulant misrepresentation, then can get damages.
o    in 1913, the only other type of misrepresentation was “innocent misrepresentation” – remedy is not damages.  It is a return to pre-contractual situation.
•    Only remedy avail. for innocent misrepresentation is recision; calling off the contract.
o    Here, cannot be rescinded, as has already been carried out.
•    If took the tort route, the only buttom to press would be fraudlant misrepresentation but then would be faced with the reality that fraud is extremely difficult to prove, because the courts have a high threshold to accept that the D. was guilty of fraud.

For tomorrow, read this case.
Read Dick Bentley, & Murray

Exception Clauses p. 838
•    Warranty, in its technical meaning, is a sub-contract
•    It has a technical meaning
o    Close reading; strict construction
•    Wallis v. Pratt – “warranty” did not apply to exclude the implied statutory “condition” of the Sale of Goods Act that products must correspond to their description.
o    ¶5 - exclusion of “any warranty of condition” does not avail a seller if there has been a ‘negligent misstatement’
o    ¶6 – in the absesnce of an explicit mention of negligence, a judge is likely to find that exemption cluases do not exclude liability for negligence.
•    Judges believe that it should be very difficult to exclude oneself from the possibility of negligence, and that it must at the very least be explicit.
•    “The rule in Canada Steamships” – adopted this extreme example of reading down.  If an exemption clause could be given a meaning but the meaning was not broad enough to extend to negligence, then it does not extend to negligence.
•    If the exemption clause could refer to something other than negligence, then it is deemed to refer to that thing.
•    P. 839 – Inconsistency.
o    A number of ways that judges tackel ‘internal inconsistency’
•    To say that the provision that the parties agreed on explicitly takes precedence over some provision that is simply there as part of a form-document.
o    The passage on 839 is accurate, but misleadingly simplistic.

Parker v. Southeast Railway
•    A case that refers to the imp. of railway
•    Bottom Page 849 – caput lupinum – “Having the head of the wolf”.  Anyone might legally ‘kill’ them.
•    Railway companies were often the targets of juries, as insurance companies are today.
•    Railway takes the pos. that the passenger signed away their rights.
o    There was a notice on the wall of the cloak-room
o    There were conditions written on the ticket
•    Page 847 – “see back”; several clauses relating to articles left by passengers – “The company will not be resonsible for any package exceeding the value of £10.”
•    Bag could not be found.  Claimed that his bag was worth £24 10s.
•    Mellish L.J. – “In and ordinary case, where an action is brought on a written agreement which is signed by the defendant, the agreement is proved by proving his signature, and, in the absesnce of fraud, it si wholly immaterial that he has not read the agreement and does not know its content …in the case [where the agreement has been reduced to writing so that the writing is the sole evidence of the agreement without signing it]there must be evidence of the agreement itself to prove that the defendant assented to it.”
•    P said that he knew there was writing on the ticket, but not what the writing was.  Said thought it may have been a receipt ¶3.
o    No question that had he read the writing, he would have been bound.
•    Contract law presumes that people, if given something to read, will read it.
•    Bramwell L.J.
o    For this judge, the question is whether the person who does not read the conditions in a better condition than he who does.
•    Bottom 848 – Mellish’s famous repropositions:
o    ¶3 – 3 propositions.  I am of the opionion there fore that the proper direction to leave to the jury in these cases is:
•    1)  That if the person receiving the ticket did not see or know that there was writing on the ticket, he is not bound by the conditions;
•    2)  that if he knew there was writing, and knew or believed that the writing contained conditions, then he is bound by the conditions;
•    [should this be subject to the condition that the writing be relevant and ‘usual’ to the circumstances?; that anything out of the ordinary would be brought specifically to the attention of the purchaser?]
•    3)  that if he knew there was writing on the ticket, but did not know or believe that the writing contained conditions, nevertheless he would be bound, if the delivering of the ticket to him in such a manner that he could see there was writing upon it, was, in the opinion of the jury, reasonable notice that the writing contained conditions.
•    [Would the purchaser be bound to every single condition on the ticket, or just the not-unusual contractual provisions?  Could they insert provisions to do with seizing first-born children and have done with it?]
•    page 849 – Bramwell L.J.
o    Bramwell is skeptical
o    Proposes that putting it into his hand should be no different than saying “read that” by the porter.  Asks what more the railway company could have done
o    Page 850 – qualifies what he says – says that the market has the answer.  If railway companies (or anyone else) began putting unreasonably terms in their contracts, then the public would hear of it and begin using alternative [forms of transportation, for example].
o    “What if there was ome unreasonable condition… Would the depositor be bound?  I might content myself by asking:  Would be be, if here were told ‘our conditions are on this ticket,’ and he did not read them.  In my judgment, he would not be bound in either case.  I think there is an implied understanding that there is no condition unreasonable to the  knowledge of the party tendering the document and not insisting on its being read – no condition not relevant to the atter in hand.”
•    Important qualification regarding ‘unreasonable conditions’

Note 5 page 851
•    J. Spurling Ltd. v. Bradshaw
o    Post-war case involving 8 casks of orange juice.
o    Most of the OJ disappeared while being stored in a bailee warehouse.
o    Decision of Denning L.
•    “I agree that the more unreasonable a clause is, the greater the notice which must be given of it.  Some clauses which I have seen would need t be printed in red ink on the face of the docuent with a read hand pointing to it before the notice could be held to be sufficient.”
•    “Next it was said that the landing account and invoice were issued after goods had been received and could not therefre be part of the cotract of bailment:  but the defendant admitted that he had receive many landing accounts before.  True, he had not troubled to read them.  True, he had not troubled to read them.  On receiving this account, he took no objection to it, left the goods there, and went on paying the warehouse rent for months afterwards.  It seems to be that by the course of business and conduct of the parties, these conditions were part of the contrat.  In these circumstances, the plaintiffs were entitled to rely on this exempting condition…”

read p 851-852

Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd. – page 857
•    sign at entrance:  “All cars parked at ownder’s risk”.
•    Then drive up a ramp and press a button for a ticket.
•    Denning L. finds that the ramp is the offer, and driving up the ramp and pressing the button is the acceptance.
•    Even if the ticker were part of the conditions, how could one be bound by conditions that one could not see until after ‘acceptance’?
•    Same as the conditions posted inside the garage.
•    ¶2 – offer accepted when the P drove up the entrance and had the ticket thrust at him by the weight-sensor.  The contract was the concluded, and could not be altered by any words printed on the ticket.
•    ¶3 - Then gives analogy whereby the ticket machine is a booking clerk ‘in disguise’
o    goes back to 3 questions pose by Mellish L.J. in Parker
o    ¶4 – counsel for the ds admitted that the Ds did not do what was reasonably sufficient to give the P notice of the exempting condition.
o    “I do not pause to enquire whether the exempting condition is void for unreasonableness.”
•    BE CAREFUL.  There is no jurisprudence that allows courts to say that an exempting clause was void for unreasonableness.  Denning L.J. was likely trying to begin this jurisprudence, but it didn’t take.
•    Denning determines that the P was not bound by the exempting condition as there was no evi. that he knew of it.

Page 860 – Signed Contracts
•    “When a documet containing contractual terms is signed, then, in the absense of fraud, or I will add, misrepresentation, the party signing is bound, as it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the codument or not.”
o    Ie:  You signed, you’re bound.
•    Courts often want to save people from their own folly.
o    This causes tension.

For next day:  Tilden, Photo Production.