Contract Law

Acceptance

Contrast between the ordinary rule of acceptance (that acceptance is acceptance when the acceptance is communicated to the offerer – deals with time, not place), and the Postal Rule of Acceptance (Acceptance occurs when the acceptance is mailed).

When does the Postal Rule of Acceptance apply?  Obviously enough, when the post is involved.  Just because the post has been used, however, does not mean that it does apply.  The theoretical rule is that it applies when the offerer intended that the offeree’s acceptance would have the benefit of this rule of acceptance.

However, when will the court deem that the offerer has deemed this acceptable?  If the offerer made the offer by post (this makes it implicit).  Not all responses by post attach this rule.  Secondly, the courts have decided that the postal rule of acceptance will attach to an acceptance if use of the post in that context would not be unusual.

30 years ago, much contracting was done by post.  Somewhat less true today.

If the offeree was not intended to have the benefit of the postal rule of acceptance, then they simply do not have it.

Schiller v. Fisher. P 423.
•    Negotiating a land purchase.
•    Going back and forth, so the role of offerer and offeree changes.
•    Kingsmont makes final offer, by letter.
•    This offer expired on Sept 1.
•    P 424 – actual agreement with expiration date.  This is an express expiration (as opposed to implicit).
•    Covering letter said, “return one copy of the Agreement to us as soon as possible.”
•    In this case, what does the word “accepted” mean in “This offer is to be accepted on or before September 1, 1976”
•    Normally, the fact of the assent would needs be communicated to the offerer by this date.
•    Nu-towne signed on Sept 1, mailed Sept 3, rec’d Sept 8.
•    Under any of the normal rules of Acceptance, it was too late…
•    The counter-argument was that the words in the cover letter expressed the offerer’s view that an acceptable acceptance was different in this case.
•    The argument went that the covering letter, stating “as soon as possible” altered the “normal” rules of acceptance.
•    This also does not fall under the Postal Rule of Acceptance – the covering letter overrules both.
•    The trial judgement was in favour of Nu-towne.  Court of Appeal was in favour of Kingsmont (offerer).  SCC found in favour of Nu-towne.
•    Basically, the would-be purchasers, Kingsmont, obviously wants out of the contract.  We don’t know why – perhaps a better offer, who knows¿  They are using this legal pretext to try to get out.  A legal nitpick.

The rules of acceptance are about the “when” of acceptance.
Under the general rule, it is not acceptance until it is communicated.  Under the postal rule, it is when it is posted, whether the Acceptance actually arrives or not.

The When of acceptance also determines the “Where of Acceptance”.
When people form contracts inter-jurisdictionally (as in Canada, where we have 12+ jurisdictions – Contract law is the responsibility of provinces), it follows that sometimes the “Where” is very important – potential law suits depend on the where.
Not just relevant between different countries – also relevant, say, between NB and NS.
This is relevant because if one of the parties decides to sue the other, the plaintiff will typically decide to sue in his or her own home jurisdiction.
Courts have to decide whether they have jurisdiction over disputes.  In the Rules of Court of any jurisdiction, there are rules to guide judges in determining whether to accept jurisdiction over cases.  One of the rules is whether the contract was formed in the jurisdcition.
P427 – Ontario rules.

Cannot ascertain where a contract is made without first determining when it was made.  This often hinges on the rules of acceptance.

P427 - EASTERN POWER LTD. v. AZIENDA COMMUNALE ENERGIA AND AMBIENTE

A cooperation agreement assented to between parties.
Is a cooperation agreement an enforceable agreement at all?  This will be examined next class.
EP looking for loss of profits on a contract that was never carried out.
If Azienda had actually appeared in the courts in Ontario, it might have changed the case.  Did eventually, and argued to have the case set aside on the grounds that the courts there did not have jurisdiction over them in Italy.
The determining factor was whether the contract was formed in Italy or Canada (Ontario).
The medium is important here – acceptance was sent my facsimile.  Does the postal rule apply?
Is fax more analogous to personal communication or postal communication?
The court judged that it was more analogous to personal communication…
This hinges again on the presumtion that the offerer has not specified what constitutes Acceptance.  The ordinary rule of acceptance applied here.  This was in part formed on the basis that a fax is instant.
This case is about the choice of forum – which court has jurisdiction.
In Canadian jurisdiction, for instance, in a case between NB and AB, a court in NB may use NB procedural law, but AB substantive law.  Forum clauses can effect this.
There is a question of whose substantive law will be used.

There is a subtext here.  Considering forum non conveniens grounds here.  Takes into account whether a judge in Ontario would have to use Italian law, and how difficult that would be.

Must take into account wehther it is a convenient or not convenient venue for the trial.  The parties did not appear to be accustomed to International Trading.  They did not have a choice of law clause, nor a choice of forum clause.

Sometimes courts will overrule these clauses if it is believed that one party is using its dominance to subvert the other.  This could have come up in the Rudder case.

Choice of forum versus Choice of Law.  Distinguish.

Postal rule does not apply to couriers…  The Ordinary rule of acceptance applied to phone, fax, emails, and couriers.  It is a tightly confined rule.

Rudder v. Microsoft Corp.

Plaintiffs saying that one particular clause (choice of forum clause) should not be binding.

Want to sue MS in Ontario, because it is cheaper in Ontario (and perhaps more sympathetic).  Ontario, since this time, has likely tightened up their class-action laws.

Ask the judge to strike out this part of the Agreement.  Argue that they did not give assent to this clause though they clicked ‘I Accept’.

Judge disagrees.  The pl says that one should liken everything not currently on the screen to fine print.  Courts approach fine print in a rather hostile way.  Judge says that it literally is not fine print (all the same text).

This is a more straightforward argument – ‘I didn’t assent.  I didn’t assent because I didn’t know about it.  I didn’t know about it because it was “fine print”.’

If the parties have chosen their forum, then it doesn’t matter about rules of acceptance regarding jurisdictions.  The contract tells you what will be the forum.

For next day, look at Electronic Transactions Act of NB.  We will examine s16, but read it all.
Will look as far as Dawson.  This examines one issue in Carlill.  Read notes on 445-446.    We might also look at the uncertainty jurisprudence.  Read opening notes of next section of syllabus.

London Drugs
•    The bailor sueing the bailee in negligence (tort)
•    The most obvious way to invoke the contractual defence is to show that one is a party to the contract.
o    Must determine whether the employees were parties to the contract.
o    On what legal theory can we make the employees party to the contract?
•    3 standard routes:
•    assignment – wouldn’t work
•    agency – the most obvious route.  A claim that when the bailee entered into the contract with the bailor, it did so as an agent for the employees.
o    True that the employees would have to show that they gave consideration, but there would be nothing (theoretically) to stop the consideration of the bailee being shared by the employees – promising safety of the chattel.
o    If this was argued (we don’t know) the answer was likely that yes, it is poss. for the employer to contract on the behalf of the employees, (as well as itself), and for the consideration for both to be the same, but all depends on intention.
o    In this case, the court “must have” concluded (or perhaps was already clear to the lawyers) that it did not happen this way.
•    trust – would work, supposeing there was some factual basis to make the argument – again, intention.  Courts are reluctant to conclude that there is an agency or trust rel. without pos. evidence of intention.
o    This is because these arguments would get around many legal arguments.  It would, if acccepted easily, be a cure-all.
o    Could transform failed gifts (without delivery) into binding agreements by saying that the donor was agreeing to hold the gift in trust for the giftee.
o    Similarly, in the law of contrats could save many third parties from plight of third parties simply by making them parties – by saying that someone else entered into the contracts on their behalf.

•    3rd parties are non-parties.  They are usually helpless and hopeless.
o    In this case, the SCC changes their status – only in the employment context. (very important).
o    Ioccobucci puts much emphasis on the identity of interest between the employer and employee.
o    “relaxes” the rule.  Does not overthrow.
o    In order to relax the doctrine in this context, gives 2 criteria:
•    1)  Parties must have intended (either explicitly or implicitly) that the employees shold benefit from the limitation of liability clause.
•    Ioccobucci finds an implied intention.  This is not that they would be parties, but that despite not being parties, they may benefit from the clause – identity of interest
•    2)  Must be in the performace of their duties, and in performance of the duties contemplated by the contract.

Insurance issue:
•    Courts are aware that the provision
•    Charges the warehouse enterprise with a maximum liability of $40.
o    The warehouse is being charged a much lower premium because of this limitation of liability clause.
o    Places the onus on the bailor to obtain insurance coverage.
o    This provision is really about who has the burden of insuring.
o    It makes sense that the owner of the goods (who knows what’s in the crate, etc.) has the responsibility for insuring it.
•    Carriers have similar contracts.

What, in effet, is the bailor here trying to do?
•    Having benefitted from a low storage-rate, based on accepting the risk on itself, it is now trying to shift the responsibility back onto the bailee.
•    Trying to have it both ways.
•    The employees will not have insurance.
o    Many tort cases are in actuality about insurance.

Is this a good decision or a bad decision?
(in a tort-sense)
•    The real purpose of tort-law is to visit punishment on the tort-feasor, so as to force [them] to ‘clean up [their] act’
•    Hank and Dennis are off the hook…
•    Is this a flaw in the case?

Laing Property Corp. v. All Seasons Display Inc.
•    Not bailor-bailee (and bailee’s employees), but tenant-landlord (and landlord’s emloyees)
•    Contract in question is a lease.
•    Page 400 – Insurance clause.
o    The landlord wants to ensure that the tenant has insurance.  This ensures that if the tenant is a future tort-feasor, the landlord and other tenants can collect damages against them
o    Also in the landlord’s name so that benefits can be collected.
o    Also absolves the landlord from responsibility for any loss, damage, or expenses.
o    Waivor of subrogation.
•    Even if the landlord’s carelessness causes the mall to burn down, and the tenant’s insurance covers the tenant, and under common law the insurance company could sue the landlord for recovery, the tenant has waived this right.
•    The landlord’s employees’ negligence did cause the mall to burn down.
•    The tenant’s insurance company “sues everyone in sight”
o    Sues the landlord (fails), and also its employees.
•    In Greewood Shopping Plaze, the SCC denied the employees any rights under the mall’s contract with the tenant…
•    Here, the B.C. C.A. follows London Drugs as far as it can, and distinguishes Greenwood Shopping Plaza…
•    Greenwood:  Even though at the heard of both cases is a lease (and not a contract of bailment) and does not invoke employees, the B.C. C.A. says that in the lease here, it is a lease, but it has other services mentioned – says that the promotion services meant that the promotion service in question, which needed to be performed by employees (similar to services in London Drugs), meant that the employees were contemplated by the lease.
o    Then apply the two factors in London Drugs to relax the doctrin of privity vis-à-vis employees
o    Was there intention to include the employees?  Did they intend the waivor of subrogation to extend to the employees?
o    It is not express, so must look for implied intention
o    Page 404 – give the intellible basis for finding implied intention – para 99 & 100.
•    1)  Is there identity of interest between the employee and employer as to the performance of the employers’ contractual obligations?  Ie:  the services must be performed by the employee.
•    2)  Did the tenant, in entering into this contract, know that the services could only be performed by human employees?
o    Repeated at para. 115.
•    In all of these cases, the relaxation of the privity rule is for a defensive purpose.
o    It is to act as a shield for a third party.
o    In no case has the courts relaxed the privity rule to allow a third party to sue on a contract.
o    This would require contract.

Law Reform Act  http://www.gnb.ca/0062/pdf-acts/l-01-2.pdf
•    In a contract between A & B that promises a benefit to C, this says that C can sue on the A-B contract to which it is not a party.
•    A & B can prevent this if they say so in the contract.
o    4(1) – a person who is not a party to a contract, but who is intended to receive some peformance under it may enforce that performance by claim for damages or otherwise.
o    Here, can likely be express or implied.  If implied, would use the rule from Laing (or London Drugs).
o    4(3) – may change their contract, but if it causes any loss to C, and C has incurred expense or undertaken an obligation in the expectation of performance, C may recover loss from any party to the contract who ought to have known that the expenses would be or had been incurred or that the obligation had been or would be undertaken.
•    NB has briefly but substantially abolished the privity problem.
•    England’s approach, a few years later (page 411) also greatly abridged the privity problem, but took the opposite approach – did it in great detail instead of sweepingly.
o    This is only part of the English statute.
•    Not sure what effet this prosiion will ultimately have.  Relatively unlitigated as of yet – do not yet know its implications.

Review – Tuesday, 12:30 in 2A
Monday – also review.  Structured.