Contract Law

Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act (NB) http://www.gnb.ca/0062/acts/acts/c%2D18%2D1.htm ss 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 23-26

•    2(3) – seems to be saying that one cannot sign away the rights assigned to you in the act.
•    24 - Where there is a contract for the sale or supply of a consumer product, the parties cannot agree to exclude or restrict any warranty or remedy provided by this Act except as provided in sections 25 and 26.
o    this section qualifies s. 2(3) – qualify only in accordancw w/25 & 26
•    25(1) – Subject to subsection (4), where there is a contract for the sale or supply of a consumer product, the parties may agree to exclude or restrict any remedy provided by this Act for breach of an express warranty, but such agreement shall be ineffective to the extent that it is shown that it would not be fair or reasonable to allow reliance on such agreement.
•    25(3) - In determining whether it would be fair or reasonable to allow reliance on an agreement to exclude or restrict any remedy provided by this Act for breach of an express warranty, regard shall be had to all the circumstances of the case.
•    so exclusion is possible as long as it is ‘fair and reasonable’
o    this is where Wilson J. got her language in Hunter v. Syncrude
o    This is the legislature’s response.  Judges do have the auth. to modify contracts in which consumers have signed away their rights.
o    In doing so, must strive for ‘fairness and reasonability’
•    This is more supple than Denning’s ver. of Fundamental Breach, which was an automatic exclusion of the limitation of liability clause.
•    Very little litigation on this act, considering its ubiquity
o    2 poss reasons:
•    The act is so effective that business parties settle rather than go through litigation while knowing that they have treated the consumer unfairly or unreasonably.
•    Consumers are foolish and lazy, especially those who have been foolish enough to sign away their rights in the first place.
•    Professor Door (?) is the drafter of this act.  Just retired from UNB.

Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd.
•    There is only one context in all of contractdom in which the sub-classification of contract terms is relevant.
o    warranty; condition
o    However, in context of remedies available to victim it is important. If victim of breach of “condition” then you have lrger selection of remedies/options than of warranty.If you are the victim of a beach of a condition, then more options are available.
•    can treat the contract as at an end; can sue for damages
o    Whereas, the victim of a breach of warranty has no other option but to make a claim for damanges – cannot cease to perform the contract.
•    For most contexts – it does not matter.
•    This case concerns a charter (of a ship).
•    When the vessel was leased, the price of shipping was high, but then went down.
•    Reason for high price of charters at this time:  Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal; formed crisis between England/France, and Egypt.  Invaded Egypt, which sank vessels in the Suez Canal.  Voyages between The Atlantic and Asia therefore took much longer.
•    To get out of the contract, tried to claim that the vessel was unsatisfactory and unseaworthy.
o    Diplock ¶2 page 576 – famous sentence for comment on final exams – look up synallagmatic
•    “human prescience being limited, it seldom does so exhaustively and often fails to do so at all.”
•    ¶3 – does the occurrence of the event deprive the party who has further undertakings still to perform of
o    If it was that kind of a breach, as to deprive the victimized party of the whole benefit, then it is a breach of a condition.
o    If it doesn’t deprive of the whole benefit, then it is the breach of a warranty
•    ¶9 – in real life, cannot classify all contract terms into just conditions and warranties.
o    supposed to classify at the point of formation
o    cannot with certainty classify all the terms as such.
•    Ex:  If buying a blue car and got a red car – difficult to say that you were deprived of the full benefit of the contract.
•    Diplock says in ¶10 – “No doubt there are many simple contratual undertakings, sometimes express but more often because of the very…”
o    There are obviously some contractual terms which are conditions
o    And there are some that are conditions
•    ¶11 – come that are of a more complex character
o    Saying that there is a 3rd class of contract term.
o    suggests that it is numerous.
o    cannot say whether or not  breach of it would deprive the victimized party essentially of the full benefit of the contract.
o    Must be classified not a priori, but from the actual consequences of the actual breach.
o    Will turn out to be condition-like, or warranty-like.
•    So we have, at the formation of a contract, conditions and warranties
•    Or they are innominant terms (or complex terms) which are divided into condition-like, or warranty-like – these are classified from the perspective of the breach.

•    In regards to this contract, says that the term that was breached was seaworthiness.
o    can be more or less substantial – depending on the situation (a hole in the hull or engine trouble)
o    Cannot tell at the formation who substantial the breach will be.

Sail Labrador Ltd. V. “Challenge One” (The)
•    SCC had to ask itself whether the contract had within it a term tatamount to a “time is of the essence” provision.
•    This is a common provision.
•    Nothing expressly in the contract to this effect.
•    SCC said ‘no’.  Did not think there was anything to that effect in the contract.
•    Though the breaching party had breached the contract, hadn’t breached a condition…

Page 654 – Misrepresentations and Warranties
•    There are 2 problem areas in Contracts where trouble tends to lie:  Exemption clauses; Pre-contractual words
•    Pre-contractual words:  For instance, the sales person may say something to induce the customer to enter into the contract.  This ‘something’ may turn out to be false.
o    Cutomer wishes to say that while there is nothing wrong with the contract per se, something happened prior to it that is relevant.
o    Evidence rule – where you have an apparently complete contract, extrinsic evidence is not admissible for modifying or contradicting the contract.
o    And yet we have seen situations where evidence does do this, but is being intro’d for another purpose.
•    The words that the ‘sales person’ utters outside the contract, but which critically induce the contract (page 654) might have 1 of 3 classifications:
o    1)  Puffery:  Words which have no legal significance.  They are mere puffery.  Ex:  “This is the best used car in Fredericton.”
o    2)  Misrepresentation:  looks like a statement of fact.  In Gallant v. All State, the assertion that the buckwheat would kill off the weeds were a statement.  If they induced the customer to enter into the ccontract, and if the words were false, then they are called a tortious misrepresentation.   Falls under tort.
o    3)  Warranties (promises):  If the words are not words of statement, but are of promise, those words (if they have legal consequence) can have consequence only in contract (the realm of promises).

Heilbut
•    Customer calls stock broker regarding the launching of a new rubber company.
•    Stock broker:  “We are.”  – entire case turns on these words.
•    Customer agrees to buy 6,000 shares
•    Company turns out not to be shares in what could legitimately be called a rubber company.
•    Does not sue the  company – it is insolvent.
•    Customer sues the stockbroker.
•    Not complaining about anything inside the contract.  He did get the shares.  He didn’t want the shares.
•     “We are” – could be a statement of fact, giving rise to liability, if at all, in tort.
•    Misprepresentation.
o    Could be a promise (warranty), giving rise to liability, if at all, under contract.
•    Problem in giving these words sig. in contract – a naked promise is valueless…
•    page 662 – At trial, the jury found that the company could not properly be called a rubber company.
o    Pre-contractual utterance was false.
o    D’s did not make a fradulant representation.
o    Did find that the SB did promise that it was a rubber compnay.
•    HoL is stuck with the findings of the jury – in particular that there was no fraud. misrepresentation here.
•    Seems that at trial, P argued that “We are” was a misrepresentation – argues under tort law.
o    If one can succeed that “we are” is fradulant misrepresentation, then can get damages.
o    in 1913, the only other type of misrepresentation was “innocent misrepresentation” – remedy is not damages.  It is a return to pre-contractual situation.
•    Only remedy avail. for innocent misrepresentation is recision; calling off the contract.
o    Here, cannot be rescinded, as has already been carried out.
•    If took the tort route, the only buttom to press would be fraudlant misrepresentation but then would be faced with the reality that fraud is extremely difficult to prove, because the courts have a high threshold to accept that the D. was guilty of fraud.

For tomorrow, read this case.
Read Dick Bentley, & Murray

Exception Clauses p. 838
•    Warranty, in its technical meaning, is a sub-contract
•    It has a technical meaning
o    Close reading; strict construction
•    Wallis v. Pratt – “warranty” did not apply to exclude the implied statutory “condition” of the Sale of Goods Act that products must correspond to their description.
o    ¶5 - exclusion of “any warranty of condition” does not avail a seller if there has been a ‘negligent misstatement’
o    ¶6 – in the absesnce of an explicit mention of negligence, a judge is likely to find that exemption cluases do not exclude liability for negligence.
•    Judges believe that it should be very difficult to exclude oneself from the possibility of negligence, and that it must at the very least be explicit.
•    “The rule in Canada Steamships” – adopted this extreme example of reading down.  If an exemption clause could be given a meaning but the meaning was not broad enough to extend to negligence, then it does not extend to negligence.
•    If the exemption clause could refer to something other than negligence, then it is deemed to refer to that thing.
•    P. 839 – Inconsistency.
o    A number of ways that judges tackel ‘internal inconsistency’
•    To say that the provision that the parties agreed on explicitly takes precedence over some provision that is simply there as part of a form-document.
o    The passage on 839 is accurate, but misleadingly simplistic.

Parker v. Southeast Railway
•    A case that refers to the imp. of railway
•    Bottom Page 849 – caput lupinum – “Having the head of the wolf”.  Anyone might legally ‘kill’ them.
•    Railway companies were often the targets of juries, as insurance companies are today.
•    Railway takes the pos. that the passenger signed away their rights.
o    There was a notice on the wall of the cloak-room
o    There were conditions written on the ticket
•    Page 847 – “see back”; several clauses relating to articles left by passengers – “The company will not be resonsible for any package exceeding the value of £10.”
•    Bag could not be found.  Claimed that his bag was worth £24 10s.
•    Mellish L.J. – “In and ordinary case, where an action is brought on a written agreement which is signed by the defendant, the agreement is proved by proving his signature, and, in the absesnce of fraud, it si wholly immaterial that he has not read the agreement and does not know its content …in the case [where the agreement has been reduced to writing so that the writing is the sole evidence of the agreement without signing it]there must be evidence of the agreement itself to prove that the defendant assented to it.”
•    P said that he knew there was writing on the ticket, but not what the writing was.  Said thought it may have been a receipt ¶3.
o    No question that had he read the writing, he would have been bound.
•    Contract law presumes that people, if given something to read, will read it.
•    Bramwell L.J.
o    For this judge, the question is whether the person who does not read the conditions in a better condition than he who does.
•    Bottom 848 – Mellish’s famous repropositions:
o    ¶3 – 3 propositions.  I am of the opionion there fore that the proper direction to leave to the jury in these cases is:
•    1)  That if the person receiving the ticket did not see or know that there was writing on the ticket, he is not bound by the conditions;
•    2)  that if he knew there was writing, and knew or believed that the writing contained conditions, then he is bound by the conditions;
•    [should this be subject to the condition that the writing be relevant and ‘usual’ to the circumstances?; that anything out of the ordinary would be brought specifically to the attention of the purchaser?]
•    3)  that if he knew there was writing on the ticket, but did not know or believe that the writing contained conditions, nevertheless he would be bound, if the delivering of the ticket to him in such a manner that he could see there was writing upon it, was, in the opinion of the jury, reasonable notice that the writing contained conditions.
•    [Would the purchaser be bound to every single condition on the ticket, or just the not-unusual contractual provisions?  Could they insert provisions to do with seizing first-born children and have done with it?]
•    page 849 – Bramwell L.J.
o    Bramwell is skeptical
o    Proposes that putting it into his hand should be no different than saying “read that” by the porter.  Asks what more the railway company could have done
o    Page 850 – qualifies what he says – says that the market has the answer.  If railway companies (or anyone else) began putting unreasonably terms in their contracts, then the public would hear of it and begin using alternative [forms of transportation, for example].
o    “What if there was ome unreasonable condition… Would the depositor be bound?  I might content myself by asking:  Would be be, if here were told ‘our conditions are on this ticket,’ and he did not read them.  In my judgment, he would not be bound in either case.  I think there is an implied understanding that there is no condition unreasonable to the  knowledge of the party tendering the document and not insisting on its being read – no condition not relevant to the atter in hand.”
•    Important qualification regarding ‘unreasonable conditions’

Note 5 page 851
•    J. Spurling Ltd. v. Bradshaw
o    Post-war case involving 8 casks of orange juice.
o    Most of the OJ disappeared while being stored in a bailee warehouse.
o    Decision of Denning L.
•    “I agree that the more unreasonable a clause is, the greater the notice which must be given of it.  Some clauses which I have seen would need t be printed in red ink on the face of the docuent with a read hand pointing to it before the notice could be held to be sufficient.”
•    “Next it was said that the landing account and invoice were issued after goods had been received and could not therefre be part of the cotract of bailment:  but the defendant admitted that he had receive many landing accounts before.  True, he had not troubled to read them.  True, he had not troubled to read them.  On receiving this account, he took no objection to it, left the goods there, and went on paying the warehouse rent for months afterwards.  It seems to be that by the course of business and conduct of the parties, these conditions were part of the contrat.  In these circumstances, the plaintiffs were entitled to rely on this exempting condition…”

read p 851-852

Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd. – page 857
•    sign at entrance:  “All cars parked at ownder’s risk”.
•    Then drive up a ramp and press a button for a ticket.
•    Denning L. finds that the ramp is the offer, and driving up the ramp and pressing the button is the acceptance.
•    Even if the ticker were part of the conditions, how could one be bound by conditions that one could not see until after ‘acceptance’?
•    Same as the conditions posted inside the garage.
•    ¶2 – offer accepted when the P drove up the entrance and had the ticket thrust at him by the weight-sensor.  The contract was the concluded, and could not be altered by any words printed on the ticket.
•    ¶3 - Then gives analogy whereby the ticket machine is a booking clerk ‘in disguise’
o    goes back to 3 questions pose by Mellish L.J. in Parker
o    ¶4 – counsel for the ds admitted that the Ds did not do what was reasonably sufficient to give the P notice of the exempting condition.
o    “I do not pause to enquire whether the exempting condition is void for unreasonableness.”
•    BE CAREFUL.  There is no jurisprudence that allows courts to say that an exempting clause was void for unreasonableness.  Denning L.J. was likely trying to begin this jurisprudence, but it didn’t take.
•    Denning determines that the P was not bound by the exempting condition as there was no evi. that he knew of it.

Page 860 – Signed Contracts
•    “When a documet containing contractual terms is signed, then, in the absense of fraud, or I will add, misrepresentation, the party signing is bound, as it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the codument or not.”
o    Ie:  You signed, you’re bound.
•    Courts often want to save people from their own folly.
o    This causes tension.

For next day:  Tilden, Photo Production.