Contract Law

Agreements to agree cannot be enforced without a mechanism.
Silence (something left out of a contract) is not as bad as an agreement to agree.  Blanks can be filled-in in various ways

Walford v. Miles
•    Addresses a question – whether an agreement to negotiate is enforceable
•    Is there such a thing as an enforceable agreement to negotiate?
•    An oral agreement is no less an agreement than a written one.
•    This case raises the collateral and no-less interesting question – what if an agreement is an agreement to negotiate in good faith (IGF)?
o    Is this distinguishable from an agreement to agree?
•    Express agreement to negotiate, but the pl says that there was an implicit agreement to negotiate IGF.
o    Good faith comes up in two contexts:
•    1) Performance of an already-existing contract – law will normally say that the business efficacy test, or the bystander test will lead to the conclusion that the parties did impliedly promise one another to fulfill duties of a contract IGF.
•    2)  Negotiation in good faith towards having a contract in the first place – the law balks at this.  Says that there is no source of this legal duty
•    In law, duties arise from something – legislation, agreements
•    Cannot locate the origin of a duty to negotiate in good faith.
•    However, what if someone agrees to negotiate IGF?
•    The law does not hold us to any promise to anyone unless that promise is contained within a contract (contract - something the law is prepared to recognize).
•    What is the origin of a duty to negotiate in good faith?
o    The House of Lords declines to impose such a duty
•    P 508 – an agreement to negotiate is no more enforceable than an agreement to agree – too uncertain.
•    Doesn’t help to add an implied promise to negotiate IGF.
•    Cannot translate a promise into an award of money, because do not know what they would have agreed, had they agreed.
•    Contract law presumes that ppl are not altruistic.
•    Presumes that ppl act as egoists – that we are selfish.  Dog-eat-dog, survival-of-the-fittest realm.
•    Presumes that the realm of contracts and the economy is one of warfare.  All’s fair (except lying).
•    P 507 (bottom) – American Jurisprudence tries hard to find an enforceable duty to negotiate in good faith.  Does not sway Lord Ackner.
o    Best endeavors – the law does recognize an obligation (when promised) to use best endeavors.
•    “I want to buy your land to build my shopping mall, but if I can’t get your land re-zoned, then I do not want to buy your land.”  The purchaser will typically enter into an agreement.  The vendor will promise the potential buying that it will use its best endeavors to carry out an application to re-zone the land.  Then, if the vendor of the land does not use best endeavors to procure rezoning
•    Courts, though will not judge whether someone has acted IGF, does involve itself in whether someone has used best endeavors – this is likely because this involves actual actions instead of intentions.
•    This sometimes looks like IGF, but is in fact distinguishable.
•    The parties have a contract, which calls on one of them to do something using best endeavors.
•    P 507 para 2 – “Apart from the absence of any term as to the duration of the collateral agreement, it contained no provision for the respondents to determine the negotiations, albeit that such a provision was essential.”
o    Often law preserves the original meaning of an English word, which in general parlance has changed its meaning.  This can be confusing.
o    “Several” – means in general parlance that there are 3 or more
•    In law, it retains its original meaning of individual – “Several states of the United States” means the individual states.
o    In this paragraph, “Determine” is used in this way.  Here, it means to terminate.

Empress Towers Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia
•    Commercial lease, with renewal clause
o    Renewal clause is common for commercial leases, for stability of presence
o    Leases do, however, want to re-negotiate periodically, to adjust rent for inflation, rising property values, etc.
o    How to balance stability with this idea.
o    In this lease, allowed to do this every five years.
•    Whoever framed this final renewal left out a saving grace of the first renewal – the mechanism to determine the negotiation – an arbitrator.
•    If the words “as mutually agreed between the Landlord and the Tenant” were not in the agreement, the preceding words could be used as a mechanism to determine fair rent.  Could have called experts – likely realtors – to determine what the fair rent was in that neighborhood.
•    But, someone thought it would “sound nicer” to mention an agreement between the parties.  This was fatal.  Takes away all objectivity.  Parties do not typically agree straight-off.
•    Looks like an agreement to agree…
o    Is this in fact what the judges are saying?
o    Look at the first sentence of the case.
o    Distinguishable from Walford v. Miles.
o    An ordinary remedy at the end of a civil case is a legal remedy – money; damages
•    Here, Empress Towers seeking a writ of possession (a writ issued to recover the possession of land - Black’s)
•    Equitable remedy
•    It is discretionary – no one has a right to an equitable remedy – one has a claim.  Equity is not in the realm of rights.
•    Courts will deny an equitable remedy if one has misconducted oneself.
•    Must go to court with clean hands
•    Here, the landlord ultimately cannot have the writ of possession because it has not bargained towards the renewal terms IGF, so not with clean hands.
•    Exercises their discretion in denying the writ of possession.
•    Saying that the landlord failed to negotiate in good faith is not the same as saying that they had a duty to do so.

Canada Square Corp. Ltd.v. Versafood Services Ltd.
•    Here the problem is mostly that of things left out of a contract.
•    Interesting from the p.o.v. of a potential draftsperson.
o    A lawyer’s primary role is not to solve problems, but to prevent them.
•    Certain parts of the desired contract here were too uncertain to determine at that point.
o    The answer is to put in a formula to render the uncertain aspects certain.
o    If a formula is incongruous with the factors left to be determined, then an arbitration clause effectively does the the same thing.
•    Significant things left out of this agreement.
o    Did not specify what area was meant to be leased
o    When the lease was to commence
o    When rent due
•    Versafoods tried to use these as an excuse to get out of the contract.  Said the contract was too uncertain.
o    The real issue is not a legal issue.
•    When judge turns to a US authority (in contracts) one knows that the judge is looking for a slightly unorthodox precedent which will allow the judge to do something that our more conservative Canadian jurisprudence does not allow.
o    Says that the U.S. case law distinguishes between the primary issues of a contract, and subsidiary issues.
o    Says that while the parties have to have agreed up on the fundamental terms (which courts cannot fill in) a lesser issue on which there is silence can (with some hesitation) be filled in by courts.
•    Courts can infer that the parties intended a reasonable term if it is a subsidiary term.
•    Normally, at this point, the court stops and tells the parties they have to agree on something, which the court then endorses.
o    In paragraph 4, the California court refers to these ‘blanks’ as “minor”

*The winners in these cases are never fully compensated – the costs that are paid to the lawyers are never fully reimbursed.  This is likely an discouragement of litigation.

L.C.D.H. Audio Visual Ltd. v. I.S.T.S. Verbatim Ltd.

o    The would-be subcontractor sued and lost.
o    Again refers to the business world as Darwinian and dog-eat-dog

For next day, read down to end of first section of new syllabus.
Consideration section.

London Drugs
•    The bailor sueing the bailee in negligence (tort)
•    The most obvious way to invoke the contractual defence is to show that one is a party to the contract.
o    Must determine whether the employees were parties to the contract.
o    On what legal theory can we make the employees party to the contract?
•    3 standard routes:
•    assignment – wouldn’t work
•    agency – the most obvious route.  A claim that when the bailee entered into the contract with the bailor, it did so as an agent for the employees.
o    True that the employees would have to show that they gave consideration, but there would be nothing (theoretically) to stop the consideration of the bailee being shared by the employees – promising safety of the chattel.
o    If this was argued (we don’t know) the answer was likely that yes, it is poss. for the employer to contract on the behalf of the employees, (as well as itself), and for the consideration for both to be the same, but all depends on intention.
o    In this case, the court “must have” concluded (or perhaps was already clear to the lawyers) that it did not happen this way.
•    trust – would work, supposeing there was some factual basis to make the argument – again, intention.  Courts are reluctant to conclude that there is an agency or trust rel. without pos. evidence of intention.
o    This is because these arguments would get around many legal arguments.  It would, if acccepted easily, be a cure-all.
o    Could transform failed gifts (without delivery) into binding agreements by saying that the donor was agreeing to hold the gift in trust for the giftee.
o    Similarly, in the law of contrats could save many third parties from plight of third parties simply by making them parties – by saying that someone else entered into the contracts on their behalf.

•    3rd parties are non-parties.  They are usually helpless and hopeless.
o    In this case, the SCC changes their status – only in the employment context. (very important).
o    Ioccobucci puts much emphasis on the identity of interest between the employer and employee.
o    “relaxes” the rule.  Does not overthrow.
o    In order to relax the doctrine in this context, gives 2 criteria:
•    1)  Parties must have intended (either explicitly or implicitly) that the employees shold benefit from the limitation of liability clause.
•    Ioccobucci finds an implied intention.  This is not that they would be parties, but that despite not being parties, they may benefit from the clause – identity of interest
•    2)  Must be in the performace of their duties, and in performance of the duties contemplated by the contract.

Insurance issue:
•    Courts are aware that the provision
•    Charges the warehouse enterprise with a maximum liability of $40.
o    The warehouse is being charged a much lower premium because of this limitation of liability clause.
o    Places the onus on the bailor to obtain insurance coverage.
o    This provision is really about who has the burden of insuring.
o    It makes sense that the owner of the goods (who knows what’s in the crate, etc.) has the responsibility for insuring it.
•    Carriers have similar contracts.

What, in effet, is the bailor here trying to do?
•    Having benefitted from a low storage-rate, based on accepting the risk on itself, it is now trying to shift the responsibility back onto the bailee.
•    Trying to have it both ways.
•    The employees will not have insurance.
o    Many tort cases are in actuality about insurance.

Is this a good decision or a bad decision?
(in a tort-sense)
•    The real purpose of tort-law is to visit punishment on the tort-feasor, so as to force [them] to ‘clean up [their] act’
•    Hank and Dennis are off the hook…
•    Is this a flaw in the case?

Laing Property Corp. v. All Seasons Display Inc.
•    Not bailor-bailee (and bailee’s employees), but tenant-landlord (and landlord’s emloyees)
•    Contract in question is a lease.
•    Page 400 – Insurance clause.
o    The landlord wants to ensure that the tenant has insurance.  This ensures that if the tenant is a future tort-feasor, the landlord and other tenants can collect damages against them
o    Also in the landlord’s name so that benefits can be collected.
o    Also absolves the landlord from responsibility for any loss, damage, or expenses.
o    Waivor of subrogation.
•    Even if the landlord’s carelessness causes the mall to burn down, and the tenant’s insurance covers the tenant, and under common law the insurance company could sue the landlord for recovery, the tenant has waived this right.
•    The landlord’s employees’ negligence did cause the mall to burn down.
•    The tenant’s insurance company “sues everyone in sight”
o    Sues the landlord (fails), and also its employees.
•    In Greewood Shopping Plaze, the SCC denied the employees any rights under the mall’s contract with the tenant…
•    Here, the B.C. C.A. follows London Drugs as far as it can, and distinguishes Greenwood Shopping Plaza…
•    Greenwood:  Even though at the heard of both cases is a lease (and not a contract of bailment) and does not invoke employees, the B.C. C.A. says that in the lease here, it is a lease, but it has other services mentioned – says that the promotion services meant that the promotion service in question, which needed to be performed by employees (similar to services in London Drugs), meant that the employees were contemplated by the lease.
o    Then apply the two factors in London Drugs to relax the doctrin of privity vis-à-vis employees
o    Was there intention to include the employees?  Did they intend the waivor of subrogation to extend to the employees?
o    It is not express, so must look for implied intention
o    Page 404 – give the intellible basis for finding implied intention – para 99 & 100.
•    1)  Is there identity of interest between the employee and employer as to the performance of the employers’ contractual obligations?  Ie:  the services must be performed by the employee.
•    2)  Did the tenant, in entering into this contract, know that the services could only be performed by human employees?
o    Repeated at para. 115.
•    In all of these cases, the relaxation of the privity rule is for a defensive purpose.
o    It is to act as a shield for a third party.
o    In no case has the courts relaxed the privity rule to allow a third party to sue on a contract.
o    This would require contract.

Law Reform Act  http://www.gnb.ca/0062/pdf-acts/l-01-2.pdf
•    In a contract between A & B that promises a benefit to C, this says that C can sue on the A-B contract to which it is not a party.
•    A & B can prevent this if they say so in the contract.
o    4(1) – a person who is not a party to a contract, but who is intended to receive some peformance under it may enforce that performance by claim for damages or otherwise.
o    Here, can likely be express or implied.  If implied, would use the rule from Laing (or London Drugs).
o    4(3) – may change their contract, but if it causes any loss to C, and C has incurred expense or undertaken an obligation in the expectation of performance, C may recover loss from any party to the contract who ought to have known that the expenses would be or had been incurred or that the obligation had been or would be undertaken.
•    NB has briefly but substantially abolished the privity problem.
•    England’s approach, a few years later (page 411) also greatly abridged the privity problem, but took the opposite approach – did it in great detail instead of sweepingly.
o    This is only part of the English statute.
•    Not sure what effet this prosiion will ultimately have.  Relatively unlitigated as of yet – do not yet know its implications.

Review – Tuesday, 12:30 in 2A
Monday – also review.  Structured.