Contract Law

Foakes v. Beer (missed last class – interviews)
•    Why doesn’t the ruling in this case come under pre-existing duty?
•    Why do we need a separate rationale?
o    We do not need the rule from Foakes v. Beer – equally analysable under pre-existing duty
o    Separate island of jurisprudence all to itself, very similar to pre-existing duty rule
o    Could be under Stilk v. Meryk
•    Is is a subset of a preexisting duty, but we treat it separately for historical reasons.

•    Why doesn’t the hypothetical situation whereby one promises to write off a $100 debt in exhange for $50 fall under the rule that we saw earlier (stilk v. merit)
o    S & M was a legal dispute
o    The answer is that the s & m type scenario was about a compromising legal dispute
o    Whereas, in our hypothetical situation, there is no legal dispute.  One is not claiming that one does not owe the money.  One is simply admitting that one cannot pay it.

Given the similarity between the Foakes v. Beer and Stott v. Merit Investment Corporation, would the way around exhibited in williams v. roffey brothers be gotten around the same was as in Stott v. Merit?
o    Williams v. Roffy brother scenario takes some of the sting out
o    Why is it not equally applicable to the Foakes v. beer scenario?
•    It would be.
•    The English courts have addressed this.  They have said that one cannot use a Williams approach to defang the approach of Foakes.
•    This is because Foakes is a decision of the house of lords, and it would take a decision of that same house to overturn it.
•    Further, the argument goes that if Williams got one out from under Foakes, there would be nothing left to Foakes.
•    Whereas, in Williams, all three judges said they were not overturning Stilk v. Merit.
•    Why won’t a Williams argument apply?  (Consideration can be found in practical benefit…)
o    The answer is because the courts have said that it won’t.
•    Williams v. Roffy Brothers says that a prac. benefit can be consideration
o    applies only if the parties already have a contract
o    though limited in this way, nevertheless, is a precedent of great interest.
o    The natural question is, “what can Canada do?  Will they follow?”
•    If Gilbert Steel were decided today, would it go another way?
•    Under Quicklaw, search “Roffey” and see what the cndn courts do when they cite Williams v. Roffey Brothers.
•    ***Look and see whether it is being followed in Canada.  This may be important for midterm.
•    Will it stand as a great precedent of our time, or will it be forgotten?
•    P. 309, para 1. – “The case not being one of a composition with a common debtor, agreed to, inter se, by several creditors. “
o    If the first creditor who gets judgment against a credit gets 100%, then the fifth creditor (for instance) may get nothing as there is nothing left.
o    Sometimes, creditors will agree amongst themselves that none of them will actually execute a judgment against the debtor.  They will take the entire assets of the debtor and divide them up.
o    Earl of Selborne says that this arrangment is binding, but cites it in a way that it would seem to be an exception to the Foakes v. Beer way, but does not mean it in this way.  In fact means that there is consideration in this arrangment.
•    This agreement between creditors is called a composition.
o    Note on page 310 para 3 – there is a point that the “chequeness” is not consideration unless it is a bargained-for chequeness.
•    Nothing is consideration unless it is treated as consideration – unless it is bargained for.  Read this over to clarify.
o    P 312 – contracts with a 3rd party.

Criteria to select promises worthy of legal enforcement
•    Promises given in return for something which the law is prepared to regard as consideration.
o    This is narrower than what ordinary people might view as consideration.
•    Promises under seal (will look at later).

•    Does our legal tradition enforce promises merely because the promisee has relied on them?
o    This is against theory, but may exist practically.
•    We now come to a series of cases where this appears to be the scenario.
o    What is going on will look like promise enforcement, but the question is whether it is really promise enforcement, or protecting resonable reliance.
•    Is it harm prevention as opposed to promise enforcement?
•    With promise enforcement, all the attention is on the promisor.
•    With harm prevention, all the attention is on the promisee.
o    The case that discovered the possibility that there might be something that strongly resembled considerationless promise enforcement was Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House ltd.
•    Lord Denning, prior to becoming a Lord.  He is a Justice here – trial judge.
•    One of the few trial cases in our text.
•    Friendly parties – just want an answer, which they will be willing to accept.
•    In this case, one of the two parties (plaintiff) have become insolvent, and is in the hands of a receiver.  The receiver has a fiduciary duty to try to take in as much money as legally possible.
•    99-year leases are quite common in England.
•    The landlord sues for 2 things (which may be the same thing, 2 ways)
o    Full rent prospectively
o    Full rent retrospectively.
•    First thing we look for is consideration (to enforce the landlord’s promise to let them pay ½ rent).
o    The promissee did rely on this promise
o    Consideration:  The tenant did pay the ½ rent, but that is not consideration – that falls under pre-existing duty.
o    There is no seal on the changed contract.  No change vis-à-vis the change.  No consideration vis-à-vis the change.
o    Denning J. does something revolutionary while saying that he is not doing anything revolutionary.
•    Claims to be following jurisprudence.
•    He makes up something and attributes it to the widom of the past.
•    Estoppel – this is the leading case of estoppel.
•    What Denning J. is faced with is a situation where the promisor made a promise to the promisee, the promisee relied reasonably on the promise, and now the promisor wants to break the promise.
•    The landlord gave the tenant a representation of the future – we call this a promise
•    This case is about whether to enforce a promise.
•    Because it is a promise.  Does not fall under trad. Jurisprudence of estoppel.
•    Allows us to make some enforcement.
•    (para 1 on page 316) – “With regard to estoppel, the representation made in relation to reducing the rent was not a representation of an existing fact.  It was a representation, in effect, as to the future, namely, that payment of the rest would not be enforced at a full rate but only at a reduced rate.  Such a representation would not give rise to an estoppel, because, as was said… a representation as to the future must be embodied as a contract or be nothing.”
•    (Para 2) “There have been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although they are said to be cases of estoppel, are not really such.  They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made, and which was in fact so acted on.  In such cases the courts have said that the promise must be honoured…  As I have said they are not cases of estoppel in the strict sense.  They are really promises – promises inteded to be binding, intended to be acted on, and in fact acted on.”
•    “In each case the court held the promise to be binding on the party making it, even though under the old common law it might be difficult to find any consideration for it.”
•    Continues – is this promise enforcement, or is it something that looks like promise enforcement, but is not?
•    Is there a meaningful difference between ordering a defendant to keep their promise, and ordering a defendant to act consistently with their promise.
•    Para 3 & 5 address the question (which we would never have to address with consideration)
•    How Binding?
•    The tenant had the audacity to argue that the promise was for the entire 99-year lease.
o    Lord Denning says no.  Will enforce the promise to some extent, but not that extent.
o    Says that the promisor can take back their promise to this promise

Reset.
•    It may be that the promisor can take back their promise
•    Estoppel-based promise-enforcement differs.
•    Promisory-estopple, or equitable-estoppel.
o    A different category of estoppel.

Next class:  Down to D & C Builders v. Rees

On TWEN is last year’s midterm.  Address questions 2 & 3 by way of sample.

Assignment #2 – “major” research essay.  Due March 13th (tentative).
Will settle on questions in the next week.  Can suggest our own topics.
Read commentary on Dec. exam on TWEN.  Can see Bell about your particular exam.  Would like to see anyone who did ‘poorly’.

Remedies
•    In our legal trad. we usually do not give the victorious plaintiff specific performance.
•    For the most part, translate the promised performance into an award of money.
•    Will study how courts approch this “translation”.
•    Money as a substitute for the performance, because to make the def. perofm literally for the plaintiff would often be to force two adversarial parties to then cooperate.
•    Allows the pl. to go out into the marketplace and buy a replacement performance.
•    Damages – the money remedy that courts award victorious plaintiffs.  This (says Bell) is the only time to use ‘Damages’ with the ‘s’.  ‘Damage’ (no ‘s’) is the injury itself.  This appears to be something that Bell will nail us to the wall for.
•    Though money is the principle remedy used by the courts, there are alternatives.
o    All non-damages remedies are lumped under equitable remedies
o    Damages was the only remedy with the courts of England before the judicature act awarded.
o    Specific performance – some occasions where no amt. of money would give the pl. what he/she wants.  Ex:  If one were buying the Mona Lisa, no amt. of money would allow the pl. to buy a substitute in the marketplace.
o    May want the def. to be prevented from doing something, as once done, it may not be undone.
•    For instance, the publishing of something injurious to one’s reputation, or a neighbour building something that would irrevocably subtract water from one’s land or alter a landscape forever.  In these situations, the pl. desires an injunction – an equitable remedy.
•    We will, however, begin with legal remedies.
•    Law is the realm of right.
o    Equitable remedies are discretionary, not of right.

•    Note quote on page 5 from Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co.
o    Damages is not a science… it is an art…
o    Try to give the pl. a money substitute award.

Page 28 – Fuller & Purdue
•    From legal realist period of 1930s.
•    Subject of the article is the reliance interest in contracts.
o    Our excerpt consists of the preface.  The establishment of the vocabulary of the article.
•    Enunciate 3 interests which a court might be seeking to vindicate when seeking to award damages to victorious plaintiff.
•    Contract law is the embodiment of laissez-faire economics.  Mirror-image of Darwinian conception of economics.
•    When people in the 30s began questioning the usefulness of an economic system which led to monopolies; when laissez-faire¬ produced the Great Depression, the public response was the invention of the regulatory/administrative state – ensured that the economy was regulated, in an effort to avert future catastrophes.
•    Legal realists attacked and reconceptualized “the legal heartland” of laissez-faire – contract law.
o    The legal realist approach can often be reduced to what courts do, that is the law.
•    If one wishes to understand the law of contract, one should not look at a treatise on contracts – one should look at what courts do in concrete cases.  Judges often deviate from supposed rules.
•    If real judges in real cases do not use supposed rules, then is a rule a rule?
•    Lord Denning, for example, in High Trees, cited a group of cases since the judicature act in which courts had enforced promises without consideration.  He pointed these out, and gave the phenomenon the name of equitable estoppel.
•    Legal realists were ‘terribly empirical’.
o    Study the law in action.

•    Fuller begins by saying that everyone says that at the end of contracts cases courts contract expectations into monetary terms.  Tries to put the vic. pl. into the same position they would have been had the def. fulfilled their obligations.
o    Label this the expectation measure of damages.
•    Great contribution of this article is to point out two other common approaches to awarding damages (two other interests).

Reliance Interest
•    Commonly, courts do not award expectation interest at all.  In many, courts award what Fuller labels the reliance measure.
•    This differs in that it tries to put the pl. in the pos. that he/she were in before the contract.  Try to make the victim “whole” again.
•    Plaintiff has not only not gained, but has in fact lost something by non-performance of the contract.
•    Para 7, page 30.  The pl. has, in reliance on the promise, changed his position.

Restitution Interest
•    See Deglman v. Guaranty Trust
•    Happens when, in the context of the contract, the pl. has conferred a benefit on the def.
o    The pl. has been impoverished to the extent of this conferral, and the def. has been enriched to the same extent.
o    Court forces the def. to ‘disgorge’ the benefit conferred; to restore the benefit to the pl.
•    If the court does this, it is trying to prevent the def. from being enriched unjustly.
o    In Deglman, court said that the nephew had conferred a benefit on his aunt (and not out of the goodness of his heart).  To prevent unjust enrichment, put his services into a dollar amount, and had the estate disgorge this amount.
o    Could not give him his expectation, as it was non-enforceable.  Instead based the decisionon equity and unjust enrichment.
•    Restitution rarely arises inside of real orthodox litigation.
o    Usually arises while trying to clean up “near-contract” situations.

Economic Analysis of Law
•    Response to Lord Atkin.
•    Page 38 – the basic insight is that the propositions of the common law are economic propositions (as, they would say, are moral propositions [such as, ‘thou shalt not steal’]).
•    The law that exists, has evolved as it has, because it is conducive to economic activity.
o    Bell calls this the “is” proposition
•    The “ought” proposition:
o    Judges ought, in deciding new cases, make the decision that is most conducive to economic efficiency.
o    Make liable the person who could have most cheaply avoided a tort, for instance.

Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.
•    Garland leased property from the Peevyhouses for the purposes of strip-mining coal.  A clause in the contract obliged Garland to perform “certain restorative and remedial work” at the end of the lease period.  All other obligations of the contract had been lived up to by both parties, but for this one.
•    The cost of performace was expertly estimated at about $29,000.
•    Ma and Pa Peevyhouse win in contract law.  That is not in dispute.
o    Issue: Should the judgment for the plaintiffs be in the amount equal to the cost of performance of the remedial measures, or for the amount that the value that the property was diminished?
o    The debate is over how to give the Peevyhouses their expectation.
•    By spending $29,000 to restore the farm to its “original” condition, its value would be increased by $300.
•    Would awarding the Peevyhouses the $29,000 simply be awarding them an unjust windfall?  Would they restore the property themselves, or pull up stakes and move to Florida?
•    The value of the land to the plaintiffs might be quite different from the actual fairmarket value.

There is no area of contract law in which there is more of a disjuncture between theory and practice, than remedies.
Here, the debate is not over which measure to use.  They both use the same measure, but in different ways.  Remedies jurisprudence is full of sub-jurisprudence.

For Next Monday, do Anglia Television, Bowlay loggin, Jarvis.