Contract Law

Our first line of defence in this course (on reserve):
•    Waddems: Contract Law in Canada
•    Cheshire and Fifoot – designed for students and practitioners.  Authoritative.
•    Attyah – Introduction to the Law of Contract.  This one is designed for students, but is at times advanced (bold, unorthodox).
o    1x/week, should be reading material on reserve.  Pick one of the cases we are doing in class, then look it up (index) in one of these books.

Electronic Communication/Transactions
http://www.gnb.ca/0062/acts/acts/e-05-5.htm
•    In most provinces now, there is some for of an Electronic Transactions Act.
•    Uniform Law Conference of Canada – contract law in Canada is a matter of property and civil rights – provincial responsibility
o    Can be different in each province – this can be odious not only for citizens, but for corporations.
o    Indirectly in Canada, we have tried to do what the Constitution doesn’t (though does mention) – the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (estb’d ~1914).  Takes the basic statutes from provinces (usually based on English statute), and tries to eliminate their differences as much as possible.  For areas of law that need new statutes, the ULCC drafts a new statute, which provinces can voluntarily adopt (either it, or a close approximation).
o    The NB Electronic Transactions Act is the result of one of these conferences.
•    NB’s ver is a mild version.
•    It is wholly permissive and facilitating.
•    Doesn’t require the use of electronic signature or anything of the like.
•    Facilitates:  As long as one intends something to be their signature, then it counts as a signature.
•    Has a provision for an electronic equivalent of registered mail.

Time of sending and receipt
16(1)Unless the sender and the addressee agree otherwise, electronic information is sent
(a)when it enters an information system outside the control of the sender, or
(b)if the sender and the addressee are in the same information system, when the sender takes the appropriate steps to make the information accessible to the addressee.
16(2)Electronic information is presumed to be received
(a)when it enters an information system designated or used by the addressee for the purpose of receiving information of the type sent and it is capable of being retrieved and processed by the addressee, or
(b)if the information enters some other information system and it is capable of being retrieved and processed by the addressee, when the addressee becomes aware that the information is in that other system.
16(3)Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as determining the place from which electronic information is sent nor the place at which it is received.

•    Sending and receiving is covered, and important.
•    This section covers time.
•    Note the use of the word “presumption” in 16(2).
o    Presumptions are rebuttable.
•    16(3) negates any link between the “when” and ther
•     “where”.  This would otherwise be very pertinent.
o    The significance of this can likely be ascertained from looking at the Eastern Power case.
•    Ordinary rules of contract law mean that wherever one opens one’s email could be where the contract is made (ex:  Sitting on a stopover in Hong Kong, whence neither party is from [is that a redundent phrase?])
•    To the extent that courts have given hints, they will use the ordinary rules of offer and acceptance.

“Firm” Offers
•    An offer which is expressed by the offerer to be open for a specified time.
o    All offers are open for some period of time – they have an expiry date.
•    A “firm” offer, the expiry date has been expressed.
•    “I offer to sell you my car for $1000.  This offer is open until 9am on Friday morning to accept.”
•    Basically saying, ‘I will not revoke it until 9am on Friday.’
•    Conveys to offeree that the offer does not have to be accepted right away – can take until the firmly specified time.
•    But (disillusioning moment) firm offers are not worth the paper that they may or may not be written on.
•    The offerer is not bound by this condition.
o    “Firm” offers are not firm at all.  End up being a trap for the offeree.
o    Even though the offer has been phrased that way, can be revoked at any time.
•    The key here is the word “revoke”.  It does not mean simply, “I’ve changed my mind.”
o    It involves communicating the ‘change of mind’ – revocation, like acceptance, is not revocation until communicated.
o    To prevent the other party from Accepting and forming a contract, must communicate the revocation before they communicate their Acceptance.
•    Why is this promise to keep the offer open not binding?
o    Lack of consideration – there is nothing being offered to keep the deal open.  [Bilateral v. unilateral?  P448 – “an offer in the unilateral sense can be revoked up to the last moment before complete performance”]
o    “The law does bind us to our word.”
o    In fact, we are not bound by any promise we make unless that is inside a contract.
•    There can be a contract to keep an offer open.
o    There must be consideration.  In other words, one can buy the right to, for instance, buy land.
o    This “buying” the right to accept or reject is called an Option.
o    An Option is a Firm Offer.  It is irrevocable.
o    The Offeree has paid the Offerer to keep the offer open for a specified period.

Unilateral v. Bilateral
Bilateral
•    Generality of offers is what the law calls bilateral offers or bilateral contracts.
•    A bilateral offer is one which, if accepted, gives rise to a bilateral contract.
•    So phrased so as to be open to verbal or promissory acceptance.
•    The offer must be phrased to be open to Acceptance (verbally)
Unilateral
•    “I offer you £100 to walk to York.”
o    This type of offer is so phrased that it is not susceptible to verbal acceptance – only by doing something.
o    It calls on the offeree to do something to accept – must be completed to form an acceptance.
o    In order to get $100 to find a lost cat, the cat must be found to constitute acceptance.
•    So phrased that it can be accepted only by doing some action.
•    Only when the offeree has completed the “thing” does the Acceptance occur.
•    This something, when done, constitutes Acceptance.
•    Often referred to as “if” Offers.
•    Either literally or analytically, they begin with an “if”.

What if this idea is filtered through the idea of revocability?
•    Unless accepted, an offer is just a promise.
•    “£100 to walk to York”
o    If this is Accepted by walking to York, then unless one has reached York (even 99% the way there), the offer can be revoked.
o    The law does not enforce promises.

Dawson v. Helicopter Exploration
•    Justice Rand is considered the greatest Jurist in the first half of the 20th-century.
o    “The Rand Formula” –
o    Rand worked to settle the boundary between Israel and its neighbours.
o    Son of a railway worker from Moncton.  Grew up poor.  Went to harvard, became lawyer, AG of NB.
o    Intercolonial in Moncton – bankrupted railways – became CN and moved to Montreal.
o    Rand became head of CN and followed to Montreal
o    Turned down SCC once, but did accept eventually.
o    Militant agnostic.
o    Served on SCC for about 15 years – short at the time. (44-’59)
o    Went off in 1959 to found law school at UWO.
o    None in ON are very old (law schools)
o    Taught at UNB.  Long-time selector of Beaverbrook scholarships.  Taught at law school here.
o    Writing style indicative of Harvard education.

Dawson
•    Cannot sue unless there is a contract
•    Company held that there was no acceptance.
•    Dawson did not go with them to find the claim.
•    Rand says that it is beyond doubt that it is not unilateral agreement – it is a bilateral offer, subject to promissory agreement.
o    This makes it a contract – enforceable.
o    It was the defendant’s fault that the “if” was not completed.
o    The “Acceptance” required complimentary action on the part of both parties.
o    [I see the reasoning here this way (it escapes Bell, he says).  If I say, “Bob, I’ll give you $10,000 to walk to Moncton by 5:00 tomorrow evening with me on your back.  If at 4:45 the next day, Bob is about to cross into Moncton, after having walked the entire way. I jump off and break Bob’s legs with a baseball bat.  Bob is put into an ambulance and brought to a Moncton Hospital..  In the course of the Criminal proceedings against me, could Bob not also sue me for the $10,000 “owed” to him under our alleged contract?]

London Drugs
•    The bailor sueing the bailee in negligence (tort)
•    The most obvious way to invoke the contractual defence is to show that one is a party to the contract.
o    Must determine whether the employees were parties to the contract.
o    On what legal theory can we make the employees party to the contract?
•    3 standard routes:
•    assignment – wouldn’t work
•    agency – the most obvious route.  A claim that when the bailee entered into the contract with the bailor, it did so as an agent for the employees.
o    True that the employees would have to show that they gave consideration, but there would be nothing (theoretically) to stop the consideration of the bailee being shared by the employees – promising safety of the chattel.
o    If this was argued (we don’t know) the answer was likely that yes, it is poss. for the employer to contract on the behalf of the employees, (as well as itself), and for the consideration for both to be the same, but all depends on intention.
o    In this case, the court “must have” concluded (or perhaps was already clear to the lawyers) that it did not happen this way.
•    trust – would work, supposeing there was some factual basis to make the argument – again, intention.  Courts are reluctant to conclude that there is an agency or trust rel. without pos. evidence of intention.
o    This is because these arguments would get around many legal arguments.  It would, if acccepted easily, be a cure-all.
o    Could transform failed gifts (without delivery) into binding agreements by saying that the donor was agreeing to hold the gift in trust for the giftee.
o    Similarly, in the law of contrats could save many third parties from plight of third parties simply by making them parties – by saying that someone else entered into the contracts on their behalf.

•    3rd parties are non-parties.  They are usually helpless and hopeless.
o    In this case, the SCC changes their status – only in the employment context. (very important).
o    Ioccobucci puts much emphasis on the identity of interest between the employer and employee.
o    “relaxes” the rule.  Does not overthrow.
o    In order to relax the doctrine in this context, gives 2 criteria:
•    1)  Parties must have intended (either explicitly or implicitly) that the employees shold benefit from the limitation of liability clause.
•    Ioccobucci finds an implied intention.  This is not that they would be parties, but that despite not being parties, they may benefit from the clause – identity of interest
•    2)  Must be in the performace of their duties, and in performance of the duties contemplated by the contract.

Insurance issue:
•    Courts are aware that the provision
•    Charges the warehouse enterprise with a maximum liability of $40.
o    The warehouse is being charged a much lower premium because of this limitation of liability clause.
o    Places the onus on the bailor to obtain insurance coverage.
o    This provision is really about who has the burden of insuring.
o    It makes sense that the owner of the goods (who knows what’s in the crate, etc.) has the responsibility for insuring it.
•    Carriers have similar contracts.

What, in effet, is the bailor here trying to do?
•    Having benefitted from a low storage-rate, based on accepting the risk on itself, it is now trying to shift the responsibility back onto the bailee.
•    Trying to have it both ways.
•    The employees will not have insurance.
o    Many tort cases are in actuality about insurance.

Is this a good decision or a bad decision?
(in a tort-sense)
•    The real purpose of tort-law is to visit punishment on the tort-feasor, so as to force [them] to ‘clean up [their] act’
•    Hank and Dennis are off the hook…
•    Is this a flaw in the case?

Laing Property Corp. v. All Seasons Display Inc.
•    Not bailor-bailee (and bailee’s employees), but tenant-landlord (and landlord’s emloyees)
•    Contract in question is a lease.
•    Page 400 – Insurance clause.
o    The landlord wants to ensure that the tenant has insurance.  This ensures that if the tenant is a future tort-feasor, the landlord and other tenants can collect damages against them
o    Also in the landlord’s name so that benefits can be collected.
o    Also absolves the landlord from responsibility for any loss, damage, or expenses.
o    Waivor of subrogation.
•    Even if the landlord’s carelessness causes the mall to burn down, and the tenant’s insurance covers the tenant, and under common law the insurance company could sue the landlord for recovery, the tenant has waived this right.
•    The landlord’s employees’ negligence did cause the mall to burn down.
•    The tenant’s insurance company “sues everyone in sight”
o    Sues the landlord (fails), and also its employees.
•    In Greewood Shopping Plaze, the SCC denied the employees any rights under the mall’s contract with the tenant…
•    Here, the B.C. C.A. follows London Drugs as far as it can, and distinguishes Greenwood Shopping Plaza…
•    Greenwood:  Even though at the heard of both cases is a lease (and not a contract of bailment) and does not invoke employees, the B.C. C.A. says that in the lease here, it is a lease, but it has other services mentioned – says that the promotion services meant that the promotion service in question, which needed to be performed by employees (similar to services in London Drugs), meant that the employees were contemplated by the lease.
o    Then apply the two factors in London Drugs to relax the doctrin of privity vis-à-vis employees
o    Was there intention to include the employees?  Did they intend the waivor of subrogation to extend to the employees?
o    It is not express, so must look for implied intention
o    Page 404 – give the intellible basis for finding implied intention – para 99 & 100.
•    1)  Is there identity of interest between the employee and employer as to the performance of the employers’ contractual obligations?  Ie:  the services must be performed by the employee.
•    2)  Did the tenant, in entering into this contract, know that the services could only be performed by human employees?
o    Repeated at para. 115.
•    In all of these cases, the relaxation of the privity rule is for a defensive purpose.
o    It is to act as a shield for a third party.
o    In no case has the courts relaxed the privity rule to allow a third party to sue on a contract.
o    This would require contract.

Law Reform Act  http://www.gnb.ca/0062/pdf-acts/l-01-2.pdf
•    In a contract between A & B that promises a benefit to C, this says that C can sue on the A-B contract to which it is not a party.
•    A & B can prevent this if they say so in the contract.
o    4(1) – a person who is not a party to a contract, but who is intended to receive some peformance under it may enforce that performance by claim for damages or otherwise.
o    Here, can likely be express or implied.  If implied, would use the rule from Laing (or London Drugs).
o    4(3) – may change their contract, but if it causes any loss to C, and C has incurred expense or undertaken an obligation in the expectation of performance, C may recover loss from any party to the contract who ought to have known that the expenses would be or had been incurred or that the obligation had been or would be undertaken.
•    NB has briefly but substantially abolished the privity problem.
•    England’s approach, a few years later (page 411) also greatly abridged the privity problem, but took the opposite approach – did it in great detail instead of sweepingly.
o    This is only part of the English statute.
•    Not sure what effet this prosiion will ultimately have.  Relatively unlitigated as of yet – do not yet know its implications.

Review – Tuesday, 12:30 in 2A
Monday – also review.  Structured.